sha512_crypt is insufficient for password hashing
Use of sha512_crypt for password hashing in versions of Keystone prior to Pike, is insufficient and provides limited protection against brute-forcing of password hashes.
Affected Services / Software
OpenStack Identity Service (Keystone). OpenStack Releases Ocata, Newton.
Keystone uses sha512_crypt for password hashing. This provides insufficient and limited protection, since sha512_crypt algorithm has a low computational cost factor, therefore making it easier to crack passwords offline in a short period of time.
The correct mechanism is to use the more secure hashing algorithms with a higher computational cost factor such as bcrypt, scrypt, or pbkdf2_sha512 instead of sha512_crypt.
It is recommended that operators upgrade to the Pike release where all future passwords would be bcrypt hashed.
Operators should also force password changes on all users , which will result in the users newly generated passwords being bcrypt hashed.
Contacts / References
Author: Luke Hinds, Red Hat
This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0081
Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1668503
Mailing List : [Security] tag on firstname.lastname@example.org
OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg