Difference between revisions of "OSSN/OSSN-0081"
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+ | == sha512_crypt is insufficient for password hashing == | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Summary === | ||
+ | |||
+ | Use of sha512_crypt for password hashing in versions of Keystone prior to Pike, is insufficient and provides limited protection against brute-forcing of password hashes. | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Affected Services / Software === | ||
+ | |||
+ | OpenStack Identity Service (Keystone). OpenStack Releases Ocata, Newton. | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Discussion === | ||
+ | |||
+ | Keystone uses sha512_crypt for password hashing. This provides insufficient and limited protection, since sha512_crypt algorithm has a low computational cost factor, therefore making it easier to crack passwords offline in a short period of time. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The correct mechanism is to use the more secure hashing algorithms with a higher computational cost factor such as bcrypt, scrypt, or pbkdf2_sha512 instead of sha512_crypt. | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Recommended Actions === | ||
+ | |||
+ | It is recommended that operators upgrade to the Pike release where all future passwords would be bcrypt hashed. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Operators should also force password changes on all users [1], which will result in the users newly generated passwords being bcrypt hashed. | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Contacts / References === | ||
+ | |||
+ | Author: Luke Hinds, Red Hat | ||
+ | [1]: https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/identity-security-compliance.html#force-users-to-change-password-upon-first-use | ||
+ | [2] http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf | ||
+ | This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0081 | ||
+ | Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1668503 | ||
+ | Mailing List : [Security] tag on openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org | ||
+ | OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg |
Revision as of 11:25, 17 September 2017
sha512_crypt is insufficient for password hashing
Summary
Use of sha512_crypt for password hashing in versions of Keystone prior to Pike, is insufficient and provides limited protection against brute-forcing of password hashes.
Affected Services / Software
OpenStack Identity Service (Keystone). OpenStack Releases Ocata, Newton.
Discussion
Keystone uses sha512_crypt for password hashing. This provides insufficient and limited protection, since sha512_crypt algorithm has a low computational cost factor, therefore making it easier to crack passwords offline in a short period of time.
The correct mechanism is to use the more secure hashing algorithms with a higher computational cost factor such as bcrypt, scrypt, or pbkdf2_sha512 instead of sha512_crypt.
Recommended Actions
It is recommended that operators upgrade to the Pike release where all future passwords would be bcrypt hashed.
Operators should also force password changes on all users [1], which will result in the users newly generated passwords being bcrypt hashed.
Contacts / References
Author: Luke Hinds, Red Hat [1]: https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/identity-security-compliance.html#force-users-to-change-password-upon-first-use [2] http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0081 Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1668503 Mailing List : [Security] tag on openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg