Difference between revisions of "OSSN/OSSN-0013"
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| + | == Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected == | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Summary === | ||
| + | Tom Leaman reported an issue to the OpenStack mailing list that | ||
| + | affects Glance property protections. A permissive property setting in the | ||
| + | Glance property protections configuration file will override any previously | ||
| + | set stricter ones. | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Affected Services / Software === | ||
| + | Glance, Folsom, Grizzly | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Discussion === | ||
| + | Glance property protections limit the users who can perform CRUD operations on | ||
| + | a Glance property to those in specific roles. When the property protections | ||
| + | rules are processed in the Folsom and Grizzly OpenStack releases, a matching | ||
| + | rule will only stop the processing of subsequent rules if it authorizes the | ||
| + | attempted action. If there is a matching rule that would reject an action that | ||
| + | is followed by another matching rule that would accept the action, then the | ||
| + | action is accepted even though one may expect it to be rejected. | ||
| + | |||
| + | In the following policy-protections.conf example, the desired result is to | ||
| + | restrict 'update' and 'delete' permissions for any property beginning with | ||
| + | 'provider_' to only users with the 'admin' role. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [^provider_.*$] | ||
| + | create = admin | ||
| + | read = admin,_member_ | ||
| + | update = admin | ||
| + | delete = admin | ||
| + | |||
| + | [.*] | ||
| + | create = _member_ | ||
| + | read = _member_ | ||
| + | update = _member_ | ||
| + | delete = _member_ | ||
| + | |||
| + | Due to the way that the rules are processed in the Folsom and Grizzly OpenStack | ||
| + | releases, the admin restriction for properties beginning with 'provider_' is | ||
| + | nullified by the '.*' permissions since it also matches the same properties. | ||
| + | This results in all users with the '_member_' role being allowed the 'create', | ||
| + | 'update', and 'delete' permissions on properties beginning with 'provider_', | ||
| + | which is not what was intended. | ||
| + | |||
| + | This bug only affects the use of user-roles in Glance. It does not occur when | ||
| + | policies are used to determine property protections. | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Recommended Actions === | ||
| + | This issue has been fixed in Havana (Glance 2013.2.2) and subsequent releases | ||
| + | by changing the property protections rule processing to stop at the first rule | ||
| + | that matches the property, even if it does not allow the attempted action. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Users of affected releases should avoid using multiple rules that would match | ||
| + | the same property. Specifically, wildcard rules should be avoided unless they | ||
| + | are the most restricive rules defined. | ||
| + | |||
| + | If a permissive rule is needed that is intended to match all properties that | ||
| + | are not matched by other rules, a carefully crafted regular expression should | ||
| + | be used instead of a wildcard as demonstrated below. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [^provider_.*$] | ||
| + | create = admin | ||
| + | read = admin,_member_ | ||
| + | update = admin | ||
| + | delete = admin | ||
| + | |||
| + | [^((?!provider_).)*$] | ||
| + | create = _member_ | ||
| + | read = _member_ | ||
| + | update = _member_ | ||
| + | delete = _member_ | ||
| + | |||
| + | In the above example, 'create', 'update', and 'delete' operations are only | ||
| + | allowed for users with the '_member_' role for properties that do not begin | ||
| + | with 'provider_'. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Configuration files with multiple property protection entries set should be | ||
| + | tested to ensure that CRUD actions are constrained in the way the administrator | ||
| + | intended. | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Contacts / References === | ||
| + | * This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0013 | ||
| + | * Original Launchpad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1271426 | ||
| + | * Original Report : http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/2014-January/024861.html | ||
| + | * Glance Property Protections : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Glance-property-protections | ||
| + | * OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org | ||
| + | * OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg | ||
Latest revision as of 17:27, 11 June 2014
Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected
Summary
Tom Leaman reported an issue to the OpenStack mailing list that affects Glance property protections. A permissive property setting in the Glance property protections configuration file will override any previously set stricter ones.
Affected Services / Software
Glance, Folsom, Grizzly
Discussion
Glance property protections limit the users who can perform CRUD operations on a Glance property to those in specific roles. When the property protections rules are processed in the Folsom and Grizzly OpenStack releases, a matching rule will only stop the processing of subsequent rules if it authorizes the attempted action. If there is a matching rule that would reject an action that is followed by another matching rule that would accept the action, then the action is accepted even though one may expect it to be rejected.
In the following policy-protections.conf example, the desired result is to restrict 'update' and 'delete' permissions for any property beginning with 'provider_' to only users with the 'admin' role.
[^provider_.*$] create = admin read = admin,_member_ update = admin delete = admin [.*] create = _member_ read = _member_ update = _member_ delete = _member_
Due to the way that the rules are processed in the Folsom and Grizzly OpenStack releases, the admin restriction for properties beginning with 'provider_' is nullified by the '.*' permissions since it also matches the same properties. This results in all users with the '_member_' role being allowed the 'create', 'update', and 'delete' permissions on properties beginning with 'provider_', which is not what was intended.
This bug only affects the use of user-roles in Glance. It does not occur when policies are used to determine property protections.
Recommended Actions
This issue has been fixed in Havana (Glance 2013.2.2) and subsequent releases by changing the property protections rule processing to stop at the first rule that matches the property, even if it does not allow the attempted action.
Users of affected releases should avoid using multiple rules that would match the same property. Specifically, wildcard rules should be avoided unless they are the most restricive rules defined.
If a permissive rule is needed that is intended to match all properties that are not matched by other rules, a carefully crafted regular expression should be used instead of a wildcard as demonstrated below.
[^provider_.*$] create = admin read = admin,_member_ update = admin delete = admin [^((?!provider_).)*$] create = _member_ read = _member_ update = _member_ delete = _member_
In the above example, 'create', 'update', and 'delete' operations are only allowed for users with the '_member_' role for properties that do not begin with 'provider_'.
Configuration files with multiple property protection entries set should be tested to ensure that CRUD actions are constrained in the way the administrator intended.
Contacts / References
- This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0013
- Original Launchpad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1271426
- Original Report : http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/2014-January/024861.html
- Glance Property Protections : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Glance-property-protections
- OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org
- OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg
