Difference between revisions of "Consistent and Secure Default Policies Popup Team"
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=== Cyborg ===
=== Cyborg ===
=== Manila ===
=== Manila ===
Revision as of 02:57, 12 December 2019
Existing policy defaults suffer from three major faults:
- the admin-ness problem: use of policy rules like 'is_admin' or hard-coded is-admin checks results in the admin-anywhere-admin-everywhere problem and drastically inhibits true multi-tenancy since by default customers cannot have admin rights on their own projects or domains
- insecure custom roles: many policy rules simply use "" as the rule, which means there is no rule: anyone can perform that action. This means creation of a custom role (say, "nova-autoscaler" requires editing every policy file across every service to block users with such a rule from performing actions unrelated to their role
- related to #2, no support for read-only roles: keystone now has a "reader" role that comes out of the box when keystone is bootstrapped, but it currently has very little value because of the use of empty rules in service policies: users with the "reader" role can still perform write actions on services if the policy rule for such an action is empty.
The keystone project has migrated all of its default policies to 1) use oslo.policy's scope_types attribute, which allows the policy engine to understand "system scope" and distinguish between an admin role assignment on a project versus an admin role assignment on the entire system, 2) ensure all rules use one of the default roles (admin, member, and reader) which both ensures support for a read-only role and prevents custom roles from accidental over-permissiveness. Although the problems being solved are slightly different, the keystone team found it was easiest to migrate everything at once. The rest of the OpenStack services can use this migration as a template for securing their own policies.
Popup Team Completion Criteria
This team will be disbanded after:
- The majority of the projects listed below have completed their policy migrations
- A document is published detailing any pitfalls, lessons learned, and best practices that other teams should be aware of
- A community goal is proposed and accepted by the TC
Use topic:policy-popup in Gerrit.
Use subject tag [policy] for mailing list discussions.
Use #openstack-dev for synchronous discussions.
- Colleen Murphy <firstname.lastname@example.org> (cmurphy) [Seeking a replacement]
- Ghanshyam Mann <email@example.com> (gmann)
- Barbican: Douglas Mendizábal (redrobot)
- Nova: Ghanshyam Mann (gmann)
- Neutron: Miguel Lavalle (mlavalle)
- Cinder: Brian Rosmaita (rosmaita)
- Cyborg: Yumeng Bao (firstname.lastname@example.org)
- Manila: Goutham Pacha Ravi (gouthamr)
- Mohammed Naser <email@example.com>
- Douglas Mendizábal (IRC: redrobot) - Barbican - We're supere interested in getting this implemented for Barbican
- Ade Lee (ade_lee) - barbican
- Miguel Lavalle (mlavalle) - neutron
- Chandan Kumar (chandankumar/raukadah)<firstname.lastname@example.org> - Help on Tempest and Patrole side
- Akihiro Motoki (amotoki) - horizon (horizon needs to support the new mechanism of policy definitions. It is different from server side support, so the team needs to explore its own way)
- Tobias Rydberg (tobberydberg)
- Erik McCormick <email@example.com> (emccormick)
- Tergel Munkhbat firstname.lastname@example.org
- Ghanshyam Mann (gmann): Nova, QA adopt testing for the new roles.
- Vishakha Agarwal (vishakha)- Keystone
Team Design Documents
Keystone (completed; use as a reference)
TBD - each project may have its own tracking mechanism, to be linked here
- All about scopes: https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/contributor/services.html#authorization-scopes
- Default roles and scopes: https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/service-api-protection.html
- Tool to test custom policy : https://pagure.io/openstack-access-policy