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	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=126544</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=126544"/>
				<updated>2016-06-09T19:51:41Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Project (OSSP) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0068|OSSN-0068]] - DoS style attack on keystone, using repeated token revocation requests, can lead to service degradation or disruption&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0067|OSSN-0067]] - Barbican server discloses SQL password and X-auth token values via LOG.debug (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0066|OSSN-0066]] - mongodb guest instance allows any user to connect (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0065|OSSN-0065]] - Glance embargoed issue (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0064|OSSN-0064]] - Keystone 'Admin_Token' in default configuration leads to insecure operation (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0063|OSSN-0063]] - Nova and Cinder key manager for Barbican misuses cached credentials (9 Jun 2016)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0062|OSSN-0062]] - Potential reuse of revoked Identity tokens (15 Dec 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0061|OSSN-0061]] - Glance image signature uses an insecure hash algorithm (MD5) (15 Dec 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Glance configuration option can lead to privilege escalation (25 Jan 2016)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host (16 Nov 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption (15 Oct 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0063&amp;diff=126543</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0063</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0063&amp;diff=126543"/>
				<updated>2016-06-09T19:49:11Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == Nova and Cinder key manager for Barbican misuses cached credentials == === Summary === During the Icehouse release the Cinder and Nova projects added a feature t...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Nova and Cinder key manager for Barbican misuses cached credentials ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
During the Icehouse release the Cinder and Nova projects added a feature&lt;br /&gt;
that supports storage volume encryption using keys stored in Barbican.&lt;br /&gt;
The Barbican key manager, that is part of Nova and Cinder, had a bug&lt;br /&gt;
that could cause an authorized user to lose access to an encryption key&lt;br /&gt;
or allow the wrong user to gain access to an encryption key.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Cinder: Icehouse, Juno, Kilo, Liberty&lt;br /&gt;
Nova: Juno, Kilo, Liberty&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Barbican key manager is a feature that is part of Nova and Cinder to&lt;br /&gt;
allow those projects to create and retrieve keys in Barbican. The key&lt;br /&gt;
manager includes a cache function that allows for a copy_key() operation&lt;br /&gt;
to work while only validating the token once with Keystone.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This cache function had a bug such that the cached token was used for&lt;br /&gt;
operations where it was no longer valid. The symptoms of this error&lt;br /&gt;
vary, but include a user not being able to access their key or the wrong&lt;br /&gt;
user being able to access a key.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An affected user would see an error similar to this in their cinder log:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  2015-12-03 09:09:03.648 TRACE cinder.volume.api Unauthorized: The&lt;br /&gt;
  request you have made requires authentication. (Disable debug mode to&lt;br /&gt;
  suppress these details.) (HTTP 401) (Request-ID:&lt;br /&gt;
  req-d2c52e0b-c16d-43ec-a7a0-7611113f1270)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Users wishing to use the Barbican key manager to provided keys for&lt;br /&gt;
volume encryption with Nova and Cinder should ensure they are using a&lt;br /&gt;
patched version.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A specification for a fix has been merged for the Mitaka release of both&lt;br /&gt;
Nova and Cinder. Additionally these patches have been backported to&lt;br /&gt;
stable/kilo and stable/liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0063&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1523646&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Nova patch for Mitaka : https://review.openstack.org/254358/&lt;br /&gt;
* Nova patch for stable/liberty: https://review.openstack.org/288490&lt;br /&gt;
* Cinder patch for Mitaka : https://review.openstack.org/254357/&lt;br /&gt;
* Cinder patch for stable/liberty: https://review.openstack.org/266678&lt;br /&gt;
* Cinder patch for stable/kilo: https://review.openstack.org/266680&lt;br /&gt;
* CVE : N/A&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0060&amp;diff=102129</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0060</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0060&amp;diff=102129"/>
				<updated>2016-01-25T20:56:17Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Contacts / References */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Glance configuration option can lead to privilege escalation ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Glance exposes a configuration option called `use_user_token` in the&lt;br /&gt;
configuration file `glance-api.conf`.  It should be noted that the&lt;br /&gt;
default setting (`True`) is secure.  If, however, the setting is&lt;br /&gt;
changed to `False` and valid admin credentials are supplied in the&lt;br /&gt;
following section (`admin_user` and `admin_password`), Glance API&lt;br /&gt;
commands will be executed with admin privileges regardless of the&lt;br /&gt;
intended privilege level of the calling user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Glance, Juno, Kilo, Liberty&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
The `use_user_token` configuration option was created to enable&lt;br /&gt;
automatic re-authentication for tokens whch are close to expiration,&lt;br /&gt;
thus preventing the tokens from expiring in the middle of&lt;br /&gt;
longer-lasting Glance commands.  Unfortunately the implementation&lt;br /&gt;
enables privilege escalation attacks by automatically executing API&lt;br /&gt;
commands as an administrator level user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By default `use_user_token` is set to `True` which is secure.  If the&lt;br /&gt;
option is disabled (set to `False`) and valid admin credentials are&lt;br /&gt;
specified in the `glance-api.conf` file, API commands will be executed&lt;br /&gt;
as the supplied admin user regardless of the intended privileges of the&lt;br /&gt;
calling user.  Glance API v2 configurations which don't enable the&lt;br /&gt;
registry service (`data_api = glance.db.registry.api`) aren't affected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Enabling unauthenticated and lower privileged users to execute Glance&lt;br /&gt;
commands with administrator privileges is very dangerous and may&lt;br /&gt;
expose risks including:&lt;br /&gt;
* tampering with images&lt;br /&gt;
* deleting images&lt;br /&gt;
* denial of service attacks&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
A comprehensive fix will be included in the Mitaka release.  Meanwhile&lt;br /&gt;
it is recommended that all users ensure that `use_user_token` is left&lt;br /&gt;
at the default setting (`True`) or commented out.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0060&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1493448&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Documentation : https://security.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Project : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Security&lt;br /&gt;
* Bug Introduction : https://review.openstack.org/#/c/29967/&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=102128</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=102128"/>
				<updated>2016-01-25T20:55:36Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Project (OSSP) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0063|OSSN-0063]] - Improper use of cached credentials in Nova and Cinder Key Manager ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0062|OSSN-0062]] - Potential reuse of revoked Identity tokens (15 Dec 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0061|OSSN-0061]] - Glance image signature uses an insecure hash algorithm (MD5) (15 Dec 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Glance configuration option can lead to privilege escalation (25 Jan 2016)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host (16 Nov 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption (15 Oct 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=99716</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=99716"/>
				<updated>2015-12-15T23:00:41Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0062|OSSN-0062]] -Potential reuse of revoked Identity tokens (15 Dec 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0061|OSSN-0061]] - Glance image signature uses an insecure hash algorithm (MD5) (15 Dec 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Embargoed Issue ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host (16 Nov 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption (15 Oct 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0062&amp;diff=99715</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0062</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0062&amp;diff=99715"/>
				<updated>2015-12-15T23:00:16Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == Potential reuse of revoked Identity tokens == === Summary === An authorization token issued by the Identity service can be revoked, which is designed to immediat...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Potential reuse of revoked Identity tokens ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
An authorization token issued by the Identity service can be revoked,&lt;br /&gt;
which is designed to immediately make that token invalid for future use.&lt;br /&gt;
When the PKI or PKIZ token providers are used, it is possible for an&lt;br /&gt;
attacker to manipulate the token contents of a revoked token such that&lt;br /&gt;
the token will still be considered to be valid.  This can allow&lt;br /&gt;
unauthorized access to cloud resources if a revoked token is intercepted&lt;br /&gt;
by an attacker.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone, Icehouse, Juno, Kilo, Liberty&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
Token revocation is used in OpenStack to invalidate a token for further&lt;br /&gt;
use.  This token revocation takes place automatically in certain&lt;br /&gt;
situations, such as when a user logs out of the Dashboard.  If a revoked&lt;br /&gt;
token is obtained by another party, it should no longer be possible to&lt;br /&gt;
use it to perform any actions within the cloud.  Unfortunately, this is&lt;br /&gt;
not the case when the PKI or PKIZ token providers are used.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When a PKI or PKIZ token is validated, the Identity service checks it&lt;br /&gt;
by searching for a revocation by the entire token.  It is possible for&lt;br /&gt;
an attacker to manipulate portions of an intercepted PKI or PKIZ token&lt;br /&gt;
that are not cryptographically protected, which will cause the&lt;br /&gt;
revocation check to improperly consider the token to be valid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
We recommend that you do not use the PKI or PKIZ token providers.  The&lt;br /&gt;
PKI and PKIZ token providers do not offer any significant benefit over&lt;br /&gt;
other token providers such as the UUID or Fernet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If you are using the PKI or PKIZ token providers, it is recommended that&lt;br /&gt;
you switch to using another supported token provider such as the UUID&lt;br /&gt;
provider.  This issue might be fixed in a future update of the PKI and&lt;br /&gt;
PKIZ token providers in the Identity service.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To check what token provider you are using, you must look in the&lt;br /&gt;
'keystone.conf' file for your Identity service.  An example is provided&lt;br /&gt;
below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  [token]&lt;br /&gt;
  #provider = keystone.token.providers.pki.Provider&lt;br /&gt;
  #provider = keystone.token.providers.pkiz.Provider&lt;br /&gt;
  provider = keystone.token.providers.uuid.Provider&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Liberty release of the Identity service, the token provider&lt;br /&gt;
configuration is different than previous OpenStack releases.  An&lt;br /&gt;
example from the Libery release is provided below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  [token]&lt;br /&gt;
  #provider = pki&lt;br /&gt;
  #provider = pkiz&lt;br /&gt;
  provider = uuid&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These configuration snippets are using the UUID token provider.  If you&lt;br /&gt;
are using any of the commented out settings from these examples, your&lt;br /&gt;
cloud is vulnerable to this issue and you should switch to a different&lt;br /&gt;
token provider.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0062&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1490804&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* CVE: CVE-2015-7546&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=99714</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=99714"/>
				<updated>2015-12-15T22:43:32Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0062|OSSN-0062]] -Potential reuse of revoked Identity tokens ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0061|OSSN-0061]] - Glance image signature uses an insecure hash algorithm (MD5) (15 Dec 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Embargoed Issue ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host (16 Nov 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption (15 Oct 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=99712</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=99712"/>
				<updated>2015-12-15T22:39:36Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0062|OSSN-0062]] -Potential reuse of revoked Identity tokens ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0061|OSSN-0061]] - Glance image signature uses an insecure hash algorithm (MD5)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Embargoed Issue ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host(16 Nov 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption (15 Oct 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0061&amp;diff=99711</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0061</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0061&amp;diff=99711"/>
				<updated>2015-12-15T22:38:42Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Glance image signature uses an insecure hash algorithm (MD5) ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
During the Liberty release the Glance project added a feature that&lt;br /&gt;
supports verifying images by their signature. There is a flaw in the&lt;br /&gt;
implementation that degrades verification by using the weak MD5&lt;br /&gt;
algorithm.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Glance, Liberty&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
A signature algorithm is typically created by hashing data and then&lt;br /&gt;
encrypting that hash in some way. In the case of the new Glance feature&lt;br /&gt;
the signature algorithm does not hash the image to be verified. It&lt;br /&gt;
rehashes the existing MD5 checksum that is used to locally verify the&lt;br /&gt;
integrity of image data stored in Glance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Glance image signature algorithm uses configurable hash algorithms.&lt;br /&gt;
No matter which algorithm is used, the overall security of the algorithm&lt;br /&gt;
is degraded to that of MD5 because instead of applying it to the image&lt;br /&gt;
data it's applied only to the MD5 checksum that already exists in&lt;br /&gt;
Glance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The image signature algorithm is a relatively new feature, introduced in&lt;br /&gt;
the Liberty release.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Users concerned with image security should be aware that the current&lt;br /&gt;
Glance signature algorithm is not secure by todays cryptographic&lt;br /&gt;
standards.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A specification for a fix has been proposed by the Glance development&lt;br /&gt;
team and is targeted for the Mitaka release.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0061&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1516031&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Glance Spec for fix : https://review.openstack.org/#/c/252462/&lt;br /&gt;
* CVE : CVE-2015-8234&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=99694</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=99694"/>
				<updated>2015-12-15T20:23:17Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0062|OSSN-0062]] -Potential reuse of revoked Identity tokens ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0061|OSSN-0061]] - Glance images signatures insecure hashes ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Embargoed Issue ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host(16 Nov 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption (15 Oct 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=97040</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=97040"/>
				<updated>2015-11-16T21:33:58Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Embargoed Issue (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host(16 Nov 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption (15 Oct 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0059&amp;diff=97039</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0059</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0059&amp;diff=97039"/>
				<updated>2015-11-16T21:33:02Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__notoc__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Trusted VM can be powered on untrusted hosts ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
A trusted VM that has been launched earlier on a trusted host can&lt;br /&gt;
still be powered on from the same host even after the trusted host is&lt;br /&gt;
compromised.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Nova, Trusted Computing Pools&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
Trusted Computing Pools aim to ensure the trustworthiness of the hosts&lt;br /&gt;
leveraging hardware-based security features. When an instance is&lt;br /&gt;
scheduled, the scheduler finds a trusted host by calling the remote&lt;br /&gt;
Attestation API for each host to check whether it is trusted or not.&lt;br /&gt;
Then, the scheduler calls the corresponding compute node to launch&lt;br /&gt;
the VM. Once the VM is launched, the scheduler is no longer involved&lt;br /&gt;
unless a migration, a resize or an evacuation is asked for that VM.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Malicious users can bypass the trust check by the Attestation API using&lt;br /&gt;
these steps:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Launch a trusted VM on a trusted host&lt;br /&gt;
# Stop the VM on the trusted host&lt;br /&gt;
# Compromise the host&lt;br /&gt;
# Power on the VM from the compromised host. There is no check by the Attestation API for powering on the VM in this case.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
We recommend investigating further if the trust check by Attestation&lt;br /&gt;
API fails but the VM still boots. Another approach is to combine&lt;br /&gt;
secure boot with trusted boot. At the same time, Nova team has&lt;br /&gt;
discussed deprecating Trusted Filter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0059&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1456228&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Nova Team Email Proposing Deprecation : http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/2015-June/067766.html&lt;br /&gt;
* CR Demoting TrustedFilter to &amp;quot;experimental&amp;quot; : https://review.openstack.org/#/c/194592&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=92698</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=92698"/>
				<updated>2015-10-15T22:08:30Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Embargoed Issue (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption (15 Oct 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0057&amp;diff=92697</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0057</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0057&amp;diff=92697"/>
				<updated>2015-10-15T22:07:40Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == DoS attack on Glance service can lead to interruption or disruption ==  === Summary === The typical Glance workflow allows authenticated users to create an image...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== DoS attack on Glance service can lead to interruption or disruption ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
The typical Glance workflow allows authenticated users to create an&lt;br /&gt;
image and upload the image content in a separate step. This can be&lt;br /&gt;
abused by malicious users to flood the Glance database with entries&lt;br /&gt;
for zero sized images.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Glance, Icehouse, Juno, Kilo, Liberty&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
Glance by default allows an authenticated user to create zero size&lt;br /&gt;
images. Those images do not consume resources on the storage backend&lt;br /&gt;
and do not hit any limits for size, but do take up space in the&lt;br /&gt;
database.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Malicious users can potentially cause database resource depletion with&lt;br /&gt;
an endless flood of 'image-create' requests.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
For current stable OpenStack releases, users can workaround this&lt;br /&gt;
vulnerability by using rate-limiting proxies to cover access to the&lt;br /&gt;
Glance API.  Rate-limiting is a common mechanism to prevent DoS and&lt;br /&gt;
Brute-Force attacks.  Rate limiting on the API requests allows a delay&lt;br /&gt;
in the consequences of the attack, but does not prevent it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, if you are using a proxy such as Repose, enable the rate&lt;br /&gt;
limiting feature by following these steps:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  https://repose.atlassian.net/wiki/display/REPOSE/Rate+Limiting+Filter&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An alternative approach to mitigate this issue would be to restrict&lt;br /&gt;
image creates to trusted administrators within your deployed Glance&lt;br /&gt;
policy.json file.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  &amp;quot;add_image&amp;quot;: &amp;quot;role:admin&amp;quot;,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another preventative action would be to monitor the logs to identify&lt;br /&gt;
excessive image create requests.  One example of such a log message from glance-api.log&lt;br /&gt;
is as follows (single line, wrapped):&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 DEBUG glance.registry.client.v1.api [req-da1cafc0-f41f-4587-a484-672ba7f3546e&lt;br /&gt;
 admin 8b04efc28055428c940505838314f262 - - -]&lt;br /&gt;
 Adding image metadata... add_image_metadata&lt;br /&gt;
 /usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/glance/registry/client/v1/api.py:161&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0057&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1401170&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0033&amp;diff=90933</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0033</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0033&amp;diff=90933"/>
				<updated>2015-09-23T19:39:58Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Contacts / References */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
== Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
In many places, OpenStack components use Python 2.x HTTPSConnection to&lt;br /&gt;
establish an SSL connection between endpoints. This does not provide&lt;br /&gt;
many of the assurances one would expect when using SSL and leaves&lt;br /&gt;
connections open to potential man-in-the-middle attacks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
All OpenStack services, Havana, Icehouse, Juno&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
A secure SSL session relies on validation of a X.509 certificate. Basic&lt;br /&gt;
checks include:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Certificate Authority trust verification&lt;br /&gt;
* Certificate revocation status&lt;br /&gt;
* Certificate expiration&lt;br /&gt;
* Certificate subject name matching&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The HTTPSConnection class is used in a large number of locations and&lt;br /&gt;
fails to check that certificates are signed by a valid authority.&lt;br /&gt;
Without that check in place, the subsequent checks (some highlighted&lt;br /&gt;
above) are largely invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The result is that an attacker who has access to the network traffic&lt;br /&gt;
between two endpoints relying on HTTPSConnection can trivially create a&lt;br /&gt;
certificate that will be accepted by HTTPSConnection as valid - allowing&lt;br /&gt;
the attacker to intercept, read and modify traffic that should be&lt;br /&gt;
encrypted by SSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Some projects have updated their code to be more secure, others have&lt;br /&gt;
not. The OSSG suggest cloud deployers check the status of the bug&lt;br /&gt;
mentioned in the 'References' section of this note to see if the&lt;br /&gt;
projects they require have updated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0033&lt;br /&gt;
* Launchpad Bugs :&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1188189&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1436082&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1276207&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/vmware-nsx/+bug/1487962&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/vmware-nsx/+bug/1488265&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0033&amp;diff=90932</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0033</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0033&amp;diff=90932"/>
				<updated>2015-09-23T19:38:31Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Contacts / References */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
== Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
In many places, OpenStack components use Python 2.x HTTPSConnection to&lt;br /&gt;
establish an SSL connection between endpoints. This does not provide&lt;br /&gt;
many of the assurances one would expect when using SSL and leaves&lt;br /&gt;
connections open to potential man-in-the-middle attacks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
All OpenStack services, Havana, Icehouse, Juno&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
A secure SSL session relies on validation of a X.509 certificate. Basic&lt;br /&gt;
checks include:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Certificate Authority trust verification&lt;br /&gt;
* Certificate revocation status&lt;br /&gt;
* Certificate expiration&lt;br /&gt;
* Certificate subject name matching&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The HTTPSConnection class is used in a large number of locations and&lt;br /&gt;
fails to check that certificates are signed by a valid authority.&lt;br /&gt;
Without that check in place, the subsequent checks (some highlighted&lt;br /&gt;
above) are largely invalid.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The result is that an attacker who has access to the network traffic&lt;br /&gt;
between two endpoints relying on HTTPSConnection can trivially create a&lt;br /&gt;
certificate that will be accepted by HTTPSConnection as valid - allowing&lt;br /&gt;
the attacker to intercept, read and modify traffic that should be&lt;br /&gt;
encrypted by SSL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Some projects have updated their code to be more secure, others have&lt;br /&gt;
not. The OSSG suggest cloud deployers check the status of the bug&lt;br /&gt;
mentioned in the 'References' section of this note to see if the&lt;br /&gt;
projects they require have updated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0033&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1188189&lt;br /&gt;
* Launchpad Bugs :&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1188189&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1436082&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1276207&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/vmware-nsx/+bug/1487962&lt;br /&gt;
** https://bugs.launchpad.net/vmware-nsx/+bug/1488265&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90931</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90931"/>
				<updated>2015-09-23T19:21:19Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0060|OSSN-0060]] - Embargoed Issue (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  (23 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0053&amp;diff=90930</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0053</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0053&amp;diff=90930"/>
				<updated>2015-09-23T19:20:57Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone tokens are the foundation of authentication and authorization&lt;br /&gt;
in OpenStack. When a service node is compromised, it is possible that&lt;br /&gt;
an attacker would have access to all tokens passing through that node.&lt;br /&gt;
With a valid token an attacker will be able to issue new tokens that&lt;br /&gt;
may be used to create trusts between the originating user and a new&lt;br /&gt;
user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone, Grizzly, Havana, Icehouse, Juno, Kilo&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
If a service node is compromised, an attacker now has access to every&lt;br /&gt;
token that passes through that node. By default, a Keystone token can&lt;br /&gt;
be exchanged for another token, and there is no restriction on scoping&lt;br /&gt;
of the new token. With the trust API, these tokens can be used to&lt;br /&gt;
delegate roles between the original user and a new user.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Trusts allow a user to set up a long term delegation that permits&lt;br /&gt;
another user to perform operations on their behalf. While tokens&lt;br /&gt;
created through trusts are limited in what they can do, the&lt;br /&gt;
limitations are only on things like changing passwords or creating&lt;br /&gt;
new tokens. This would grant an attacker access to all the operations&lt;br /&gt;
available to the originating user in their projects, and the roles that&lt;br /&gt;
are delegated through the trust.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are other ways that a compromised token can be misused beyond the&lt;br /&gt;
methods described here. This note addresses one possible path for&lt;br /&gt;
vulnerabilities based on the unintended access that could be gained&lt;br /&gt;
from trusts created through intercepted tokens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This behavior is intrinsic to the bearer token model used within&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone / OpenStack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
The following steps are recommended to reduce exposure, based on the&lt;br /&gt;
granularity and accepted level of risk in a given environment:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. Monitor and audit trust creation events within your environment.&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone emits notifications on trust creation and deletion that are&lt;br /&gt;
accessible through system logs or, if configured, the CADF&lt;br /&gt;
data/security/trust resource extension.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. Offer roles that cannot create trusts / delegate permissions /&lt;br /&gt;
assign new roles via Keystone to users. This limits the vector of&lt;br /&gt;
attack to compromising Keystone directly or man-in-the-middle capture&lt;br /&gt;
of a separate token that has the authorization to create&lt;br /&gt;
trusts/delegate/assign roles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Retain the default token lifespan of 1 hour.  Many workloads require&lt;br /&gt;
a single token for the whole workload, and take more than one hour, so&lt;br /&gt;
installations have increased token lifespans back to the old value of&lt;br /&gt;
24 hours - increasing their exposure to this issue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0053&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1455582&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Hierarchical Roles : https://review.openstack.org/#/c/125704&lt;br /&gt;
* Policy by URL : https://review.openstack.org/#/c/192422&lt;br /&gt;
* Unified policy file : https://review.openstack.org/#/c/134656&lt;br /&gt;
* Endpoint_ID from URL : https://review.openstack.org/#/c/199844&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90512</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90512"/>
				<updated>2015-09-18T02:21:22Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0056&amp;diff=90511</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0056</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0056&amp;diff=90511"/>
				<updated>2015-09-18T02:20:42Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Cached keystone tokens may be accepted after revocation ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone auth_token middleware token and revocation list caching is used&lt;br /&gt;
to reduce the load on the keystone service. The default token cache time&lt;br /&gt;
is set to 300 seconds and the default token revocation list cache time&lt;br /&gt;
is set to 10 seconds. This creates a misleading expectation that revoked&lt;br /&gt;
tokens will not be accepted more than 10 seconds after revocation,&lt;br /&gt;
however the maximum validity of a cached token must be assumed to be the&lt;br /&gt;
cache duration. System owners should make a risk based decision to&lt;br /&gt;
balance token lifespan with performance requirements and if the use of&lt;br /&gt;
revoked tokens is an unacceptable risk then caching should be disabled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
OpenStack Services that use Keystone middleware: Juno, Kilo, Liberty&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
There are multiple options for configuring token caching in the keystone&lt;br /&gt;
auth_token middleware. These options include token_cache_time,&lt;br /&gt;
revocation_cache_time and check_revocations_for_cached, with each option&lt;br /&gt;
affecting the different stages of token caching and revocation.&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on the configuration the previously mentioned options, an&lt;br /&gt;
attacker could use a compromised token for up to token_cache_time seconds&lt;br /&gt;
before the token becomes disabled. To mitigate this vulnerability, a&lt;br /&gt;
change was issued in Juno where the default Token Revocation List (TRL)&lt;br /&gt;
cache time was reduced to 10 seconds and the&lt;br /&gt;
check_revocations_for_cached option was added. The addition of a token&lt;br /&gt;
to a TRL does not guarantee that cached tokens will be rejected&lt;br /&gt;
considering the operational nature of token caching. For instance, if&lt;br /&gt;
the check_revocations_for_cached is disabled then tokens are valid after&lt;br /&gt;
caching token_cache_time or the designated expiration given to the&lt;br /&gt;
token. Otherwise (if check_revocations_for_cached is enabled) then&lt;br /&gt;
tokens are rejected after the revocation_cache_time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
System owners should weigh the risk of an attacker using a revoked token&lt;br /&gt;
versus the performance implications of reducing the token cache time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Review the implications of the default 300 second token cache time and&lt;br /&gt;
any risks associated with the use of revoked tokens for up to that cache&lt;br /&gt;
time. If this is unacceptable, reduce the cache time to reduce the&lt;br /&gt;
attack window or disable token caching entirely.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0056&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/python-keystoneclient/+bug/1287301&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90498</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90498"/>
				<updated>2015-09-17T21:16:25Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Keystonemiddleware allowing access after token revocation('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0058&amp;diff=90497</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0058</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0058&amp;diff=90497"/>
				<updated>2015-09-17T21:16:02Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
When using the LVMISCSIDriver with Cinder, the credentials for CHAP&lt;br /&gt;
authentication are not formatted correctly in the tgtadm configuration&lt;br /&gt;
file. This leads to a condition where an operator will expect that&lt;br /&gt;
volumes can only be mounted with the authentication credentials when,&lt;br /&gt;
in fact, they can be mounted without the credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Cinder, Icehouse&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
When requesting that LVMISCSIDriver based volumes use the CHAP&lt;br /&gt;
authentication protocol, Cinder will add the credentials for&lt;br /&gt;
authentication to the configuration file for the tgtadm&lt;br /&gt;
application. In pre-Juno versions of Cinder the key name for these&lt;br /&gt;
credentials is incorrect. This incorrect key name will cause tgtadm&lt;br /&gt;
to not properly parse those credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With incorrect credentials in place, tgtadm will fail to authenticate&lt;br /&gt;
volume mounting when requested by Cinder. The failed setting of&lt;br /&gt;
credentials through the configuration file will also allow&lt;br /&gt;
unauthenticated access to these volumes. This can allow instances&lt;br /&gt;
on the same network as the volumes to mount them without providing the&lt;br /&gt;
credentials to the tgtadm application.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This behavior can be confirmed by displaying the accounts associated&lt;br /&gt;
with a volume. For volumes which have authentication enabled, you will&lt;br /&gt;
see an account listed in the output of the tgtadm application. The&lt;br /&gt;
account names created by Cinder will be randomly generated and will&lt;br /&gt;
appear as 20 character strings. To print the information for volumes&lt;br /&gt;
the following command can be run on nodes with attached volumes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
    # tgtadm --lld iscsi --op show --mode target&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
User names will be found in the `Account information:` section.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
If possible, Cinder should be updated to the Juno release or newer. If&lt;br /&gt;
this is not possible, then the following guidance will help mitigate&lt;br /&gt;
unwanted traffic to the affected nodes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. Identify the nodes that will be exposing Cinder volumes with the&lt;br /&gt;
LVMISCSIDriver and the nodes that will need to attach those volumes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. Implement either security group port rules or iptables rules on&lt;br /&gt;
the nodes exposing the volumes to only allow traffic through port 3260&lt;br /&gt;
from nodes that will need to attach volumes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0058&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1329214&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90496</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90496"/>
				<updated>2015-09-17T21:08:07Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Keystonemiddleware allowing access after token revocation('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0054&amp;diff=90495</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0054</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0054&amp;diff=90495"/>
				<updated>2015-09-17T21:07:27Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login == === Summary === Horizon uses the Python based Django web framework. Older versions of this framework allow an una...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Potential Denial of Service in Horizon login ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Horizon uses the Python based Django web framework. Older versions of&lt;br /&gt;
this framework allow an unauthorized user to fill up the session store&lt;br /&gt;
database causing a Horizon denial of service. A fix for Django is&lt;br /&gt;
available but works only with Kilo and later versions of Horizon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Horizon, Django, Essex, Folsom, Grizzly, Havana, Icehouse, Juno&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
Django will record the session ID of web requests even when the request&lt;br /&gt;
is from an unauthorized user. This allows an attacker to populate the&lt;br /&gt;
session store database with invalid session information, potentially&lt;br /&gt;
causing a denial of service condition by filling the database with&lt;br /&gt;
useless session information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Django developers have released a fix for this issue which is&lt;br /&gt;
included in software versions 1.4.21, 1.7.9 and 1.8.3. Horizon&lt;br /&gt;
administrators should ensure that they are using an up to date version&lt;br /&gt;
of Django to avoid being affected by this vulnerability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Versions of Horizon prior to Kilo cannot run with the fixed version of&lt;br /&gt;
Django, and may require updating to a newer version of OpenStack.&lt;br /&gt;
Administrators can test if their deployment is affected by attempting to&lt;br /&gt;
inject invalid sessions into the session store database using the&lt;br /&gt;
following script and then querying the session store database to check&lt;br /&gt;
if multiple 'aaaaa' session ID's were recorded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  for i in {1..100}&lt;br /&gt;
  do&lt;br /&gt;
    curl -b &amp;quot;sessionid=aaaaa;&amp;quot; http://HORIZON__IP/auth/login/ &amp;amp;&amp;gt; /dev/null&lt;br /&gt;
  done&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If possible, affected users should upgrade to the Kilo or newer release&lt;br /&gt;
of Horizon, allowing them to use the fixed version of Django.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0054&lt;br /&gt;
* Django fix : https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2015/jul/08/security-releases/&lt;br /&gt;
* Django CVE : CVE-2015-5143&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/horizon/+bug/1457551&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90487</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90487"/>
				<updated>2015-09-17T18:41:56Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Keystonemiddleware allowing access after token revocation('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Another Horizon login page vulnerability to a DoS attack  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0055&amp;diff=90486</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0055</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0055&amp;diff=90486"/>
				<updated>2015-09-17T18:38:26Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
OpenStack services (for example Nova and Glance) typically use a&lt;br /&gt;
service account in Keystone to perform actions.  In some cases this&lt;br /&gt;
service account has full admin privileges, may therefore perform any&lt;br /&gt;
action on your cloud, and should be protected appropriately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Most OpenStack services / all versions&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
In many cases, OpenStack services require an OpenStack account to&lt;br /&gt;
perform API actions such as validating Keystone tokens.  Some&lt;br /&gt;
deployment tools grant administrative level access to these service&lt;br /&gt;
accounts, making these accounts very powerful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A service account with administrator access could be used to:&lt;br /&gt;
* destroy/modify/access data&lt;br /&gt;
* create or destroy admin accounts&lt;br /&gt;
* potentially escalate to undercloud access&lt;br /&gt;
* log in to Horizon&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Service accounts can use the &amp;quot;service&amp;quot; role rather than admin.  You&lt;br /&gt;
can check what role the service account has by performing the following&lt;br /&gt;
steps:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. List roles:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
     openstack role list&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. Check the role assignment for the service user in question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
     openstack role assignment list --user &amp;lt;service_user&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Compare the ID listed in the &amp;quot;role&amp;quot; column from step 2 with the role&lt;br /&gt;
IDs listed in step 1.  If the role is listed as &amp;quot;admin&amp;quot;, the service&lt;br /&gt;
account has full admin privileges on the cloud.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is possible to change the role to &amp;quot;service&amp;quot; for some accounts but&lt;br /&gt;
this may have unexpected consequences for services such as Nova and&lt;br /&gt;
Neutron, and is therefore not recommended for inexperienced admins.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If a service account does have admin, it's advisable to closely&lt;br /&gt;
monitor login events for that user to ensure that it is not used&lt;br /&gt;
unexpectedly.  In particular, pay attention to unusual IPs using the&lt;br /&gt;
service account.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0055&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1464750&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90485</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=90485"/>
				<updated>2015-09-17T18:27:16Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0059|OSSN-0059]] - Trusted vm can be powered on untrusted host('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0058|OSSN-0058]] - Cinder LVMISCIDriver allows possible unauthenticated mounting of volumes ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0057|OSSN-0057]] - DoS style attack on Glance service can lead to service interruption or disruption ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0056|OSSN-0056]] - Keystonemiddleware allowing access after token revocation('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0055|OSSN-0055]] - Service accounts may have cloud admin privileges (2 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0054|OSSN-0054]] - Another Horizon login page vulnerability to a DoS attack  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0053|OSSN-0053]] - Keystone token disclosure may result in malicious trust creation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0052|OSSN-0052]] - Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs (17 Sep 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0051|OSSN-0051]] - keystonemiddleware can allow access after token revocation  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0050|OSSN-0050]] - Disabling users &amp;amp; groups may not invalidate previously-issued tokens  ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0052&amp;diff=90484</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0052</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0052&amp;diff=90484"/>
				<updated>2015-09-17T18:26:29Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Python-swiftclient exposes raw token values in debug logs ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
The password and authentication token configuration options for the&lt;br /&gt;
python-swiftclient are not marked as secret. The values of these options&lt;br /&gt;
will be logged to the standard logging output when the controller is run&lt;br /&gt;
in debug mode.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Python-swiftclient, Swift, Glance, Juno, Kilo&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
When using the python-swiftclient to connect to Glance, and the&lt;br /&gt;
'glance-api.conf' has set the value of the debug option to True, the&lt;br /&gt;
requests sent through the API, including user and token details, will be&lt;br /&gt;
captured in the local log mechanism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is recommended to use the debug level in configurations only when&lt;br /&gt;
necessary to troubleshoot an issue. When the debug flag is set, the&lt;br /&gt;
resulting logs should be treated as having sensitive information and as&lt;br /&gt;
such should have strict permissions around the file and containing&lt;br /&gt;
directory set in the operating system. Additionally, the logs should&lt;br /&gt;
not be transported off the system in plaintext such as through syslog.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The debug level can be turned off by setting the following option in&lt;br /&gt;
the `glance-api.conf` file:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
    [DEFAULT]&lt;br /&gt;
    debug = false&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0052&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/python-swiftclient/+bug/1470740&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0049&amp;diff=85313</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0049</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0049&amp;diff=85313"/>
				<updated>2015-07-07T13:46:05Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Discussion */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
The password and authentication token configuration options for the&lt;br /&gt;
ironic driver in nova are not marked as secret. The values of these&lt;br /&gt;
options will be logged to the standard logging output when the&lt;br /&gt;
controller is run in debug mode.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Nova, Ironic, Juno, Kilo&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
When using nova with the ironic driver, an operator will need to specify&lt;br /&gt;
either the password or an authentication token for the ironic admin&lt;br /&gt;
user's keystone credentials. Under normal circumstances this is not an&lt;br /&gt;
issue, but when running the API server with logging levels set to&lt;br /&gt;
include the DEBUG message level these credentials will be exposed in&lt;br /&gt;
the logs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Logging of configuration values is controlled by the `secret` flag for&lt;br /&gt;
any oslo configuration option. Without this flag set, the value for a&lt;br /&gt;
configuration option will be displayed in the logs. In the case of the&lt;br /&gt;
ironic credentials, these options are not marked as secret.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This presents a challenge to any operator who might have increased the&lt;br /&gt;
log verbosity for the purposes of debugging or extended log collection.&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on permissions and log storage location, these values could&lt;br /&gt;
be read by an intruder to the system. The credentials will provide&lt;br /&gt;
anyone who controls them access to the ironic API server's&lt;br /&gt;
administrative functions. Additionally, they could be used in conjunction&lt;br /&gt;
with OpenStack Identity functions to issue new authentication tokens or&lt;br /&gt;
perform further malicious activity depending on the scope of the&lt;br /&gt;
administrative account access (for example, modifying account&lt;br /&gt;
permissions).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All nova installations that have values defined for the&lt;br /&gt;
`admin_password` or `admin_auth_token` options in the `ironic` section,&lt;br /&gt;
and have set `debug=true` in the `DEFAULT` section of their&lt;br /&gt;
configuration file will be affected by this issue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
As of the Liberty-1 release of nova, this issue has been resolved.&lt;br /&gt;
It has also been backported to the Kilo and Juno stable releases, which&lt;br /&gt;
can be expected in the 2015.1.1 and 2014.2.4 tags, respectively.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where possible, nova deployments should be updated to one of these&lt;br /&gt;
releases: Liberty-1, 2015.1.1 (Kilo), or 2014.2.4 (Juno).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If updating the nova deployment is not feasible, operators should&lt;br /&gt;
turn off the debug logging level whenever it is not in use and ensure&lt;br /&gt;
that log files produced from those debug sessions are stored securely.&lt;br /&gt;
To disable the debug log level, the nova configuration file should be&lt;br /&gt;
editted as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
    [DEFAULT]&lt;br /&gt;
    debug = False&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0049&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1451931&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Oslo Config Special Handling Instructions: http://docs.openstack.org/developer/oslo.config/cfg.html#special-handling-instructions&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=85312</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=85312"/>
				<updated>2015-07-07T13:43:31Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0049|OSSN-0049]] - Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode (7 Jul 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0049&amp;diff=85311</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0049</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0049&amp;diff=85311"/>
				<updated>2015-07-07T13:42:44Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode == === Summary === The password and authentication token configuration options for th...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Nova ironic driver logs sensitive information while operating in debug mode ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
The password and authentication token configuration options for the&lt;br /&gt;
ironic driver in nova are not marked as secret. The values of these&lt;br /&gt;
options will be logged to the standard logging output when the&lt;br /&gt;
controller is run in debug mode.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Nova, Ironic, Juno, Kilo&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
When using nova with the ironic driver, an operator will need to specify&lt;br /&gt;
either the password or an authentication token for the ironic admin&lt;br /&gt;
user's keystone credentials. Under normal circumstances this is not an&lt;br /&gt;
issue, but when running the API server with logging levels set to&lt;br /&gt;
include the DEBUG message level these credentials will be exposed in&lt;br /&gt;
the logs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Logging of configuration values is controlled by the `secret` flag for&lt;br /&gt;
any oslo configuration option. Without this flag set, the value for a&lt;br /&gt;
configuration option will be displayed in the logs. In the case of the&lt;br /&gt;
ironic credentials, these options are not marked as secret.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This presents a challenge to any operator who might have increased the&lt;br /&gt;
log verbosity for the purposes of debugging or extended log collection.&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on permissions and log storage location, these values could&lt;br /&gt;
be read by an intruder to the system. The credentials will provide&lt;br /&gt;
anyone who controls them access to the ironic API server's&lt;br /&gt;
administrative functions. Additionally, they could be used in conjuction&lt;br /&gt;
with OpenStack Identity functions to issue new authentication tokens or&lt;br /&gt;
perform further malicious activity depending on the scope of the&lt;br /&gt;
administrative account access (for example, modifying account&lt;br /&gt;
permissions).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All nova installations that have values defined for the&lt;br /&gt;
`admin_password` or `admin_auth_token` options in the `ironic` section,&lt;br /&gt;
and have set `debug=true` in the `DEFAULT` section of their&lt;br /&gt;
configuration file will be affected by this issue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
As of the Liberty-1 release of nova, this issue has been resolved.&lt;br /&gt;
It has also been backported to the Kilo and Juno stable releases, which&lt;br /&gt;
can be expected in the 2015.1.1 and 2014.2.4 tags, respectively.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where possible, nova deployments should be updated to one of these&lt;br /&gt;
releases: Liberty-1, 2015.1.1 (Kilo), or 2014.2.4 (Juno).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If updating the nova deployment is not feasible, operators should&lt;br /&gt;
turn off the debug logging level whenever it is not in use and ensure&lt;br /&gt;
that log files produced from those debug sessions are stored securely.&lt;br /&gt;
To disable the debug log level, the nova configuration file should be&lt;br /&gt;
editted as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
    [DEFAULT]&lt;br /&gt;
    debug = False&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0049&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1451931&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Oslo Config Special Handling Instructions: http://docs.openstack.org/developer/oslo.config/cfg.html#special-handling-instructions&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=80876</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=80876"/>
				<updated>2015-05-11T14:17:53Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug (11 May 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0046&amp;diff=80875</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0046</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0046&amp;diff=80875"/>
				<updated>2015-05-11T14:17:04Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* OSSN-0046 */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Setting services to debug mode can also set Pecan to debug ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
When debug mode is set for a service using Pecan (via ''--debug'' or&lt;br /&gt;
''CONF.debug=True'') Pecan is also set to debug. This can result in&lt;br /&gt;
accidental information disclosures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Blazar, Ceilometer, Cue, Gnocchi, Ironic, Kite, Libra, Pecan, Tuskar&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
Although it's best practice to run production environments with&lt;br /&gt;
debugging functionality disabled, experience shows us that many&lt;br /&gt;
deployers choose to run OpenStack with debugging enabled to aid with&lt;br /&gt;
administration and fault finding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When Pecan is running in debug mode, the following capabilities are made&lt;br /&gt;
available to anyone who can interact with the API service:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Retrieve a stack trace of failed Pecan calls&lt;br /&gt;
* Retrieve a full list of environment variables containing potentially&lt;br /&gt;
sensitive information such as API credentials, passwords etc.&lt;br /&gt;
* Set an execution breakpoint which hangs the service with a pdb shell,&lt;br /&gt;
resulting in a denial of service&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
At time of writing, Ceilometer, Gnocchi and Ironic have released fixes.&lt;br /&gt;
Deployers are encouraged to apply these fixes (see launchpad bug in&lt;br /&gt;
References) in their clouds. For services that do not have a fix, or&lt;br /&gt;
where fixes cannot be applied in existing deployments, we advise not&lt;br /&gt;
using the debug configuration for affected services in production&lt;br /&gt;
environments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0046&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ironic/+bug/1425206&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Pecan : http://www.pecanpy.org/&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=78684</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=78684"/>
				<updated>2015-04-30T14:54:38Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions (30 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode also sets Pecan to debug ('''Work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0048&amp;diff=78683</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0048</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0048&amp;diff=78683"/>
				<updated>2015-04-30T14:54:05Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__notoc__  == Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions ==  === Summary === Glance is using the Python assert statement for validating the HTTP method typ...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__notoc__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Glance method filtering does not work under certain conditions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Glance is using the Python assert statement for validating the HTTP&lt;br /&gt;
method type in its caching middleware for some image endpoints. The&lt;br /&gt;
Python documentation states that when optimization is requested&lt;br /&gt;
(command line option -O), assert statements will not be evaluated.&lt;br /&gt;
This results in a condition where these method validations will not&lt;br /&gt;
occur and can allow a specific method to be called with a different&lt;br /&gt;
HTTP verb.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Glance, Icehouse, Juno, Kilo&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
Glance uses the Python assert statement to validate the HTTP method&lt;br /&gt;
for some of the image endpoints in the version 1 and 2 REST interfaces.&lt;br /&gt;
In circumstances where glance is being run with Python optimization&lt;br /&gt;
enabled (by using the -O command line option), these assert statements&lt;br /&gt;
will not be evaluated. In these cases, the HTTP verb is unchecked for&lt;br /&gt;
the requested endpoints.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The endpoints and methods affected by this are the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* GET on /v1/images/{image_id}&lt;br /&gt;
* DELETE on /v1/images/{image_id}&lt;br /&gt;
* GET on /v2/images/{image_id}/file&lt;br /&gt;
* DELETE on /v2/images/{image_id}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This can lead to access violations in some configurations. For&lt;br /&gt;
example, if filtering were occurring in front of the glance API to&lt;br /&gt;
restrict queries based on HTTP method and IP address, an attacker&lt;br /&gt;
could circumvent this filtering by matching the endpoint regular&lt;br /&gt;
expression and providing a different HTTP verb. In this example&lt;br /&gt;
an attacker would be able to download or delete images from glance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Assuming a user were restricted by network filtering to only send&lt;br /&gt;
DELETE requests to the glance API endpoint. The user could attempt to&lt;br /&gt;
circumvent the filtering by sending a well crafted request to the&lt;br /&gt;
endpoint that would actually retrieve the named image. If an image ID&lt;br /&gt;
were known to be &amp;quot;12345&amp;quot;, then a DELETE request sent to the glance API&lt;br /&gt;
endpoint &amp;quot;/v2/images/12345/file&amp;quot; would end up matching the GET URI&lt;br /&gt;
pattern. This would retrieve the image from glance, thus exploiting the&lt;br /&gt;
filtering.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
As of the Kilo-rc1 release of glance, this vulnerability has been&lt;br /&gt;
patched. It has also been backported to the stable branch of the Juno&lt;br /&gt;
release and will be officially updated in the 2014.2.4 tag of glance.&lt;br /&gt;
This will not be fixed for Icehouse.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kilo deployments should be updated to the rc1 tag. Juno deployments&lt;br /&gt;
should be updated to the 2014.2.4 tag. Operators maintaining Icehouse&lt;br /&gt;
deployments of glance should consider upgrading to the Juno 2014.2.4&lt;br /&gt;
release.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0048&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1414532&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Python assert documentation: https://docs.python.org/3/reference/simple_stmts.html#the-assert-statement&lt;br /&gt;
* Python optimize documentation: https://docs.python.org/2/using/cmdline.html#envvar-PYTHONOPTIMIZE&lt;br /&gt;
* Glance v1 API: http://developer.openstack.org/api-ref-image-v1.html&lt;br /&gt;
* Glance v2 API: http://developer.openstack.org/api-ref-image-v2.html&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=77779</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=77779"/>
				<updated>2015-04-19T18:32:26Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0048|OSSN-0048]] - Glance using assert for method checking in middleware ('''Work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings (19 Apr 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode also sets Pecan to debug ('''Work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0047&amp;diff=77778</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0047</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0047&amp;diff=77778"/>
				<updated>2015-04-19T18:31:46Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings == === Summary === Keystone's OS-FEDERATION extension does not enforce a link betwee...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Keystone does not validate that identity providers match federation mappings ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone's OS-FEDERATION extension does not enforce a link between an&lt;br /&gt;
identity provider and a federation mapping.  This can lead to assertions&lt;br /&gt;
or claims from one identity provider being used with mappings intended&lt;br /&gt;
for use with another identity provider, which could result in users&lt;br /&gt;
obtaining access to resources that they are not intended to have.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone, Juno, Kilo&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone's OS-FEDERATION extension allows for a set of environment&lt;br /&gt;
variables provided by a trusted identity provider to be used as mapping&lt;br /&gt;
inputs to determine group membership (and ultimately role assignment).&lt;br /&gt;
Mapping rules are intended to be identity provider specific, as&lt;br /&gt;
different identity providers provide their assertions or claims in&lt;br /&gt;
different forms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Juno release of Keystone, there is no ability within Keystone&lt;br /&gt;
itself to enforce that assertions or claims from an identity provider&lt;br /&gt;
are actually being used against a mapping that is associated with that&lt;br /&gt;
same identity provider.  A malicious user from one trusted identity&lt;br /&gt;
provider could access a Keystone federated authentication URL for a&lt;br /&gt;
different trusted identity provider.  Depending on the content of the&lt;br /&gt;
assertions or claims and the mapping rules, this could result in a user&lt;br /&gt;
gaining access to resources that they are not intended to access.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consider an example deployment where Keystone is configured to trust two&lt;br /&gt;
identity providers ('idp1' and 'idp2').  The federation mapping for&lt;br /&gt;
'idp1' might result in users of the 'devops' group having the 'admin'&lt;br /&gt;
role on a specific project.  If a user with an assertion or claim from&lt;br /&gt;
'idp2' that says they are in the 'devops' group uses the authentication&lt;br /&gt;
URL that is associated with 'idp1', they could also be given the 'admin'&lt;br /&gt;
role just as if they were a 'devops' user from 'idp1'.  This access&lt;br /&gt;
should not be allowed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Even though the Juno release of Keystone does not have the ability to&lt;br /&gt;
enforce that an identity provider and a mapping match, it is possible to&lt;br /&gt;
configure the frontend webserver that is used to deploy Keystone to&lt;br /&gt;
perform this enforcement.  Each identity provider supported by Keystone&lt;br /&gt;
has its own authentication URL.  It is recommended that the webserver&lt;br /&gt;
configuration configures its underlying federation plug-ins to&lt;br /&gt;
cryptograhically enforce that an identity provider is only valid for&lt;br /&gt;
its associated authentication URL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, the SAML protocol uses an asymmetric keypair to sign the&lt;br /&gt;
requests and responses that are transmitted between an identity provider&lt;br /&gt;
and a service provider (Keystone in our case).  When using Apache HTTPD&lt;br /&gt;
as a webserver for Keystone, a separate 'Location' directive can be used&lt;br /&gt;
for each federated authentication URL.  The directives that define the&lt;br /&gt;
certificate of the identity provider for the underlying HTTPD module&lt;br /&gt;
that is handling the SAML protocol can be defined within the identity&lt;br /&gt;
provider specific 'Location' directives.  This will ensure that a signed&lt;br /&gt;
SAML assertion from one trusted identity provider will only be&lt;br /&gt;
successfully validated when used against the appropriate authentication&lt;br /&gt;
URL.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is an example with the mod_auth_mellon HTTPD module:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  &amp;lt;Location /v3/OS-FEDERATION/identity_providers/idp1/protocols/saml2/auth&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
    AuthType &amp;quot;Mellon&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
    MellonEnable &amp;quot;auth&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
    ...&lt;br /&gt;
    MellonIdPMetadataFile /etc/httpd/mellon/idp1-metadata.xml&lt;br /&gt;
    MellonEndpointPath /v3/OS-FEDERATION/identity_providers/idp1/protocols/saml2/auth/mellon&lt;br /&gt;
  &amp;lt;/Location&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
  &amp;lt;Location /v3/OS-FEDERATION/identity_providers/idp2/protocols/saml2/auth&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
    AuthType &amp;quot;Mellon&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
    MellonEnable &amp;quot;auth&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
    ...&lt;br /&gt;
    MellonIdPMetadataFile /etc/httpd/mellon/idp2-metadata.xml&lt;br /&gt;
    MellonEndpointPath /v3/OS-FEDERATION/identity_providers/idp2/protocols/saml2/auth/mellon&lt;br /&gt;
  &amp;lt;/Location&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the above example, we have two identity providers ('idp1' and&lt;br /&gt;
'idp2').  Each identity provider has their own 'Location' directive,&lt;br /&gt;
and the 'MellonIdPMetadataFile' directive that points to the metadata&lt;br /&gt;
that contains the certificate of the identity provider is specific to&lt;br /&gt;
each 'Location' directive.  This configuration will not allow a signed&lt;br /&gt;
assertion from 'idp1' to be used against the authentication URL for&lt;br /&gt;
'idp2'.  An attempt to do so would be rejected by mod_auth_mellon and&lt;br /&gt;
would never actually reach Keystone's OS-FEDERATION extention.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is recommended to read the Keystone federation documentation as well&lt;br /&gt;
as the documentation for the HTTPD module that you are using for your&lt;br /&gt;
federation method of choice.  Some useful links to this documentation&lt;br /&gt;
are provided in the references section of this note.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Kilo release of Keystone, it is also possible to have Keystone&lt;br /&gt;
enforce that an assertion actually comes from the identity provider that&lt;br /&gt;
is associated with the authentication URL.  This is performed by&lt;br /&gt;
comparing an identity provider identifier value from the assertion or&lt;br /&gt;
claim with an identifier that is stored as a part of the identity&lt;br /&gt;
provider within Keystone.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To enable this functionality, you must set the 'remote_id_attribute'&lt;br /&gt;
setting in keystone.conf, which defines the environment variable that&lt;br /&gt;
contains the identity provider identifier.  You then must add the&lt;br /&gt;
identifier value that the 'remote_id_attribute' will contain as one of&lt;br /&gt;
the 'remote_ids' values of the associated identity provider in Keystone.&lt;br /&gt;
This can be done using the Identity API directly, or via the 'openstack'&lt;br /&gt;
command-line utility.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is recommended that you use a webserver configuration that has&lt;br /&gt;
identity provider specific 'Location' directives as described above in&lt;br /&gt;
addition to using the new 'remote_ids' checking in the Kilo release.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0047&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1390124&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Keystone Federation Docs : http://docs.openstack.org/developer/keystone/configure_federation.html&lt;br /&gt;
* mod_auth_mellon Docs : https://github.com/UNINETT/mod_auth_mellon/wiki&lt;br /&gt;
* mod_shib Docs : https://wiki.shibboleth.net/confluence/display/SHIB2/NativeSPApacheConfig&lt;br /&gt;
* mod_auth_openidc Docs : https://github.com/pingidentity/mod_auth_openidc&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=77239</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=77239"/>
				<updated>2015-04-09T14:53:51Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0047|OSSN-0047]] - No validation between client's IdP and Keystone IdP ('''Work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0046|OSSN-0046]] - Setting services to debug mode also sets Pecan to debug ('''Work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=75407</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=75407"/>
				<updated>2015-03-11T18:10:47Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0045|OSSN-0045]] - Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK) (11 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] - Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0045&amp;diff=75405</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0045</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0045&amp;diff=75405"/>
				<updated>2015-03-11T18:10:07Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Vulnerable clients allow a TLS protocol downgrade (FREAK)==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Some client-side libraries, including un-patched versions of OpenSSL,&lt;br /&gt;
contain a vulnerability which can allow a man-in-the-middle (MITM) to&lt;br /&gt;
force a TLS version downgrade. Even though this vulnerability exists in&lt;br /&gt;
the client side, an attack known as FREAK is exploitable when TLS&lt;br /&gt;
servers offer weak cipher choices. This security note provides guidance&lt;br /&gt;
to mitigate the FREAK attack on the server side, so that TLS provides&lt;br /&gt;
reasonable security for even un-patched clients.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Any service using TLS. Depending on the backend TLS library, this&lt;br /&gt;
can include many components of an OpenStack cloud:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack services&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack clients&lt;br /&gt;
* Web servers (Apache, Nginx, etc)&lt;br /&gt;
* SSL/TLS terminators (Stud, Pound, etc)&lt;br /&gt;
* Proxy services (HAProxy, etc)&lt;br /&gt;
* Miscellaneous services (eventlet, syslog, ldap, smtp, etc)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
TLS connections are established by a process known as a TLS handshake.&lt;br /&gt;
During this process a client first sends a message to the server known&lt;br /&gt;
as &amp;quot;HELLO&amp;quot;, where among other things the client lists all of the TLS&lt;br /&gt;
encryption ciphers it supports. In the next step, the server responds&lt;br /&gt;
with its own &amp;quot;HELLO&amp;quot; packet, in which the server picks one of the cipher&lt;br /&gt;
options the client offered. After this the client and server continue on&lt;br /&gt;
to securely exchange a secret which becomes a master key.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The FREAK attack exploits a flaw in client logic in which vulnerable&lt;br /&gt;
clients don't actually check that the cipher which was selected by the&lt;br /&gt;
server was one they had offered in the first place. This creates the&lt;br /&gt;
possibility that an attacker on the network somewhere between the client&lt;br /&gt;
and server can alter the client's HELLO packet, removing all choices&lt;br /&gt;
except for really weak ciphers known as &amp;quot;export grade ciphers&amp;quot;. If the&lt;br /&gt;
server supports these weak ciphers, it will (regretfully) chose it, as&lt;br /&gt;
it appears that this is the only option that the client supports, and&lt;br /&gt;
send it back in the server HELLO message.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Export grade ciphers are a legacy of a time when the US government&lt;br /&gt;
prohibited the export of cryptographic ciphers which were stronger than&lt;br /&gt;
512 bits for asymmetric ciphers and 40 bits for symmetric ciphers. Today&lt;br /&gt;
these ciphers are easily and quickly crackable using commodity hardware&lt;br /&gt;
or cloud resources.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Since this is a vulnerability in client logic, the best option is to&lt;br /&gt;
ensure that all clients update to the latest version of the affected&lt;br /&gt;
library. For more details about upgrading OpenSSL please see the link to&lt;br /&gt;
the OpenSSL advisory in the &amp;quot;Further discussion&amp;quot; section below. Since it&lt;br /&gt;
is unfeasible to assume that all clients have updated, we should also&lt;br /&gt;
mitigate this on the TLS server-side.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To mitigate the FREAK attack on the server side, we need to remove&lt;br /&gt;
support for any ciphers which are weak. This is to prevent a MITM from&lt;br /&gt;
forcing the negotiation of a weak cipher. In particular we need to&lt;br /&gt;
remove support for any export grade ciphers, which are especially weak.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first step is to find what versions your TLS server currently&lt;br /&gt;
supports.  Two useful solutions exist for this: SSL Server Test at&lt;br /&gt;
Qualys SSL Labs can be used to scan any web accessible endpoints, and&lt;br /&gt;
SSLScan is a command line tool which attempts a TLS connection to a&lt;br /&gt;
server with all possible cipher suites.  Please see &amp;quot;tools&amp;quot; below for&lt;br /&gt;
links to both.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The specific steps required to configure which cipher suites are&lt;br /&gt;
supported in a TLS deployment depend on the software and configuration,&lt;br /&gt;
and are beyond the scope of this note. Some good starting places are&lt;br /&gt;
provided below in the section: &amp;quot;Resources for configuring TLS options&amp;quot;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0045&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : N/A&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* CVE: CVE-2015-0204 (OpenSSL)&lt;br /&gt;
* Further discussion of the issue:&lt;br /&gt;
** http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/03/attack-of-week-freak-or-factoring-nsa.html&lt;br /&gt;
** https://www.smacktls.com/&lt;br /&gt;
** https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150108.txt&lt;br /&gt;
* Tools:&lt;br /&gt;
** SSLScan: http://sourceforge.net/projects/sslscan/&lt;br /&gt;
** SSL Server Test: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/&lt;br /&gt;
* Resources for configuring TLS options:&lt;br /&gt;
** In OpenStack: http://docs.openstack.org/security-guide/content/tls-proxies-and-http-services.html&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=74748</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=74748"/>
				<updated>2015-03-02T21:08:15Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0044|OSSN-0044]] - Older versions of noVNC allow session theft (2 Mar 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] -Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0044&amp;diff=74747</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0044</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0044&amp;diff=74747"/>
				<updated>2015-03-02T21:07:36Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == Older versions of noVNC allow session theft == === Summary === Commonly packaged versions of noVNC allow an attacker to hijack user sessions even when TLS is ena...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Older versions of noVNC allow session theft ==&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Commonly packaged versions of noVNC allow an attacker to hijack user&lt;br /&gt;
sessions even when TLS is enabled. noVNC fails to set the secure flag&lt;br /&gt;
when setting cookies containing an authentication token.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Nova, when embedding noVNC prior to v0.5&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
Versions of noVNC prior to October 28, 2013 do not properly set the&lt;br /&gt;
secure flag on cookies for pages served over TLS. Since noVNC stores&lt;br /&gt;
authentication tokens in these cookies, an attacker who can modify&lt;br /&gt;
user traffic can steal these tokens and connect to the VNC session.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Affected deployments can be identified by looking for the &amp;quot;secure&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
flag on the token cookie set by noVNC on TLS-enabled installations. If&lt;br /&gt;
the secure flag is missing, the installation is vulnerable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the time of writing, Debian, Ubuntu and Fedora do not provide&lt;br /&gt;
versions of this package with the appropriate patch.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
noVNC should be updated to version 0.5 or later. If this is not&lt;br /&gt;
possible, the upstream patch should be applied individually.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Upstream patch:&lt;br /&gt;
https://github.com/kanaka/noVNC/commit/ad941faddead705cd611921730054767a0b32dcd&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0044&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1420942&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* CVE: in progress-http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/02/17/1&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=73151</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=73151"/>
				<updated>2015-02-06T16:37:24Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0043|OSSN-0043]] - glibc 'Ghost' vulnerability can allow remote code execution  (5 Feb 2015)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] -Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0043&amp;diff=73044</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0043</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0043&amp;diff=73044"/>
				<updated>2015-02-05T12:49:06Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == glibc 'GHOST' vulnerability can allow remote code execution ==  === Summary === A serious vulnerability in the GNU C library (glibc) gethostbyname* functions can...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== glibc 'GHOST' vulnerability can allow remote code execution ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
A serious vulnerability in the GNU C library (glibc) gethostbyname*&lt;br /&gt;
functions can allow an attacker to perform remote code execution with&lt;br /&gt;
the privileges of the application that calls the gethostbyname*&lt;br /&gt;
function. The vulnerable functions are used by a vast number of&lt;br /&gt;
programs, effectively any time a network socket is used in a linux&lt;br /&gt;
system, so the full exploitability of this vulnerability will not&lt;br /&gt;
become known immediately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The publishers of this vulnerability, Qualys, have announced a proof of&lt;br /&gt;
concept exploit for the Exim mail server, which bypasses operating&lt;br /&gt;
system protections such as ASLR and DEP.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
All versions running on Linux installations with a vulnerable glibc&lt;br /&gt;
library.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
The GNU C library (glibc), from versions 2.2 to 2.17 inclusive, has&lt;br /&gt;
a group of vulnerable functions for hostname/address resolution. There&lt;br /&gt;
is a buffer overflow in the __nss_hostname_digits_dots() function which&lt;br /&gt;
is used by the gethostbyname*() group of functions. The maximum amount&lt;br /&gt;
of memory that can be overwritten is sizeof(char *), i.e. 4 bytes on&lt;br /&gt;
typical 32-bit systems and 8 bytes on typical 64-bit systems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These low-level functions are linked by many other C/C++ programs and&lt;br /&gt;
interpreted languages like Python, Perl and Bash, so this vulnerability&lt;br /&gt;
is insidious and will appear in cases where it would not at first seem&lt;br /&gt;
obvious. There are many cases in a typical Linux installation where&lt;br /&gt;
these functions will be used, generally wherever a hostname is resolved&lt;br /&gt;
to an IP address, although in newer applications an IPv6 compatible&lt;br /&gt;
function, getaddinfo() may be used instead.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This vulnerability could let an attacker remotely execute code in cases&lt;br /&gt;
where they control the input to a function that performs hostname&lt;br /&gt;
resolution. There are no currently-known OpenStack-specific&lt;br /&gt;
exploitation paths associated with this vulnerability. However, the&lt;br /&gt;
Python socket library presents a gethostbyname() wrapper around the&lt;br /&gt;
glibc function, and there are various ways in which this could be&lt;br /&gt;
exposed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
The glibc library is loaded into memory when a process that uses it&lt;br /&gt;
starts up, so to fix the vulnerability, glibc should be updated to a&lt;br /&gt;
non-vulnerable version (2.18 or newer) and all services which use glibc&lt;br /&gt;
should be restarted to replace the version in memory. Due to the number&lt;br /&gt;
of places where these vulnerable functions are used, this effectively&lt;br /&gt;
means that vulnerable systems must be restarted after updating glibc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0043&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1415416&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* CVE: CVE-2015-0235&lt;br /&gt;
* Source advisory: https://www.qualys.com/research/security-advisories/GHOST-CVE-2015-0235.txt&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=70721</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=70721"/>
				<updated>2014-12-18T06:41:10Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] -Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0038&amp;diff=70706</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0038</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0038&amp;diff=70706"/>
				<updated>2014-12-18T02:06:32Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__  == Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker ==  === Summary === Suds is a Python SOAP client for consuming Web Services. Its default cache implement...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Suds is a Python SOAP client for consuming Web Services. Its default&lt;br /&gt;
cache implementation stores pickled objects to a predictable path in&lt;br /&gt;
/tmp. This can be used by a local attacker to redirect SOAP requests via&lt;br /&gt;
symlinks or run a privilege escalation or code execution attack.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Cinder, Nova, Grizzly, Havana, Icehouse&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Python 'suds' package is used by oslo.vmware to interface with SOAP&lt;br /&gt;
service APIs and both Cinder and Nova have dependencies on oslo.vmware&lt;br /&gt;
when using VMware drivers. By default suds uses an on-disk cache that&lt;br /&gt;
places pickle files, serialised Python objects, into a known location&lt;br /&gt;
'/tmp/suds'. A local attacker could use symlinks or place crafted files&lt;br /&gt;
into this location that will later be deserialised by suds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By manipulating the content of the cached pickle files, an attacker can&lt;br /&gt;
redirect or modify SOAP requests. Alternatively, pickle may be used to&lt;br /&gt;
run injected Python code during the deserialisation process. This can&lt;br /&gt;
allow the spawning of a shell to execute arbitrary OS level commands&lt;br /&gt;
with the permissions of the service using suds, thus leading to possible&lt;br /&gt;
privilege escalation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the time of writing, the suds package appears largely unmaintained&lt;br /&gt;
upstream. However, vendors have released patched versions that do not&lt;br /&gt;
suffer from the predictable cache path problem. Ubuntu is known to offer&lt;br /&gt;
one such patched version (python-suds_0.4.1-2ubuntu1.1).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Actions ===&lt;br /&gt;
The recommended solution to this issue is to disable cache usage in the&lt;br /&gt;
configuration as shown:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
  client.set_options(cache=None)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A fix has been released to oslo.vmware (0.6.0) that disables the use of&lt;br /&gt;
the disk cache by default. Cinder and Nova have both adjusted their&lt;br /&gt;
requirements to include this fixed version. Deployers wishing to re-enable&lt;br /&gt;
the cache should ascertain whether or not their vendor shipped suds package&lt;br /&gt;
is susceptible and consider the above advice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0038&lt;br /&gt;
* Original Launchpad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1341954&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;br /&gt;
* Suds: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/suds&lt;br /&gt;
* CVE: CVE-2013-2217&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=70662</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=70662"/>
				<updated>2014-12-17T16:17:48Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: /* Published Security Notes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] -Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=70661</id>
		<title>Security Notes</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security_Notes&amp;diff=70661"/>
				<updated>2014-12-17T16:16:54Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The OpenStack Security Group (OSSG) publishes Security Notes to advise users of security related issues.  Security notes are similar to advisories; they address vulnerabilities in 3rd party tools typically used within OpenStack deployments and provide guidance on common configuration mistakes that can result in an insecure operating environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For advice on how to write OpenStack Security Notes see the [[Security/Security_Note_Process|Security Note Process]] documentation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Published Security Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0042|OSSN-0042]] - Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit (17 Dec 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0041|OSSN-0041]] -Linux ISCSI Admin Utility (tgtadm) does not work with Cinder (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0040|OSSN-0040]] - Neutron LBaaS VIP port does not enforce security groups when used with Open VSwitch (&amp;quot;work in progress&amp;quot;)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0039|OSSN-0039]] - Configuring OpenStack deployments to prevent POODLE attacks (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0038|OSSN-0038]] - Suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker ('''work in progress''')&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0037|OSSN-0037]] - Configure Horizon to mitigate BREACH/CRIME attacks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0036|OSSN-0036]] - Horizon does not set Secure Attribute in cookies (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0035|OSSN-0035]] - HTTP Strict Transport Security not enabled on Horizon Dashboard (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0034|OSSN-0034]] - Restarting memcached loses revoked token list (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0033|OSSN-0033]] - Some SSL-Enabled connections fail to perform basic certificate checks (19 Sep 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0032|OSSN-0032]] - Disabling a tenant does not disable a user token (30 Aug 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0031|OSSN-0031]] - Nova Baremetal exposes previous tenant data (2 Jul 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0030|OSSN-0030]] - Bash 'shellshock' bug can lead to code injection vulnerability (26 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0029|OSSN-0029]] - Neutron firewall rules lack port restrictions when using protocol 'any' (24 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0028|OSSN-0028]] - Nova leaks compute host SMBIOS serial number to guests (3 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0027|OSSN-0027]] - Neutron ARP cache poisoning vulnerability (16 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0026|OSSN-0026]] - Unrestricted write permission to config files can allow code execution (5 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0025|OSSN-0025]] - Swift can allow images to be accessed by anyone on the same network when using delay_auth_decision (21 Oct 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0024|OSSN-0024]] - Sensitive data exposure by logging in python-keystoneclient (25 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0023|OSSN-0023]] - Keystone logs auth tokens in URLs at the INFO log level (4 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0022|OSSN-0022]] - Nova Networking does not enforce security group rules following a soft reboot of an instance (11 Aug 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0021|OSSN-0021]] - Users of compromised accounts should verify Keystone trusts (25 July 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0020|OSSN-0020]] - Disassociating floating IP from a VM does not terminate NAT connections (15 Sep 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0019|OSSN-0019]] - Cinder SSH Pool will auto-accept SSH host signatures by default (30 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0018|OSSN-0018]] - Nova Network configuration allows guest VMs to connect to host services (25 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0017|OSSN-0017]] - Session-fixation vulnerability in Horizon when using the default signed cookie sessions (20 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0016|OSSN-0016]] - Cinder wipe fails in an insecure manner on Grizzly (3 Jun 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0015|OSSN-0015]] - Glance allows non-admin users to create public images (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0014|OSSN-0014]] - Cinder drivers set insecure file permissions (31 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0013|OSSN-0013]] - Some versions of Glance do not apply property protections as expected (7 May 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0012|OSSN-0012]] - OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability can lead to OpenStack compromise (10 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0011|OSSN-0011]] - Heat templates with invalid references allows unintended network access (4 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0010|OSSN-0010]] - Sample Keystone v3 policy exposes privilege escalation vulnerability (17 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0009|OSSN-0009]] - Potential token revocation abuse via group membership (2 Apr 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0008|OSSN-0008]] - DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption (9 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/OSSN-0007|OSSN-0007]] - Live migration instructions recommend unsecured libvirt remote access (6 Mar 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1254619|OSSN-0006]] - Keystone can allow user impersonation when using REMOTE_USER for external authentication (17 Jan 2014)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1226078|OSSN-0005]] - Glance allows sharing of images between projects without consumer project approval (11 Dec 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1237989|OSSN-0004]] - Authenticated users are able to update passwords without providing their current password (22 Nov 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1168252|OSSN-0003]] - Keystone configuration should not be world readable (13 May 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1155566|OSSN-0002]] - HTTP POST limiting advised to avoid Essex/Folsom Keystone DoS (23 Apr 2013)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[OSSN/1098582|OSSN-0001]] - Selecting LXC as Nova Virtualization Driver can lead to data compromise (15 Mar 2013)&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0042&amp;diff=70514</id>
		<title>OSSN/OSSN-0042</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=OSSN/OSSN-0042&amp;diff=70514"/>
				<updated>2014-12-17T01:42:47Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;__NOTOC__ == Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit ==  === Summary === Keystone provides &amp;quot;scoped&amp;quot; tokens that are constrained to use by a single project. A user...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;__NOTOC__&lt;br /&gt;
== Keystone token scoping provides no security benefit ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Summary ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone provides &amp;quot;scoped&amp;quot; tokens that are constrained to use by a&lt;br /&gt;
single project. A user may expect that their scoped token can only be&lt;br /&gt;
used to perform operations for the project it is scoped to, which is not&lt;br /&gt;
the case. A service or other party who obtains the scoped token can use&lt;br /&gt;
it to obtain a token for a different authorized scope, which may be&lt;br /&gt;
considered a privilege escalation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Affected Services / Software ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone, Diablo, Essex, Folsom, Grizzly, Havana, Icehouse, Juno, Kilo&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Discussion ===&lt;br /&gt;
This is not a bug in keystone, it's a design feature that some users may&lt;br /&gt;
expect to bring security enhancement when it does not. The OSSG is&lt;br /&gt;
issuing this security note to highlight the issue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many operations in OpenStack will take a token from the user and pass it&lt;br /&gt;
to another service to perform some portion of the intended operation.&lt;br /&gt;
This token is very powerful and can be used to perform many actions for&lt;br /&gt;
the user. Scoped tokens appear to limit their use to the project and&lt;br /&gt;
roles they were granted for but can also be used to request tokens with&lt;br /&gt;
other scopes. It's important to note that this only works with currently&lt;br /&gt;
valid tokens. Once a token expires it cannot be used to gain a new&lt;br /&gt;
token.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Token scoping helps avoid accidental leakage of tokens because using&lt;br /&gt;
tokens with other services requires the extra step of requesting a new&lt;br /&gt;
re-scoped token from keystone. Scoping can help with audit trails and&lt;br /&gt;
promote good code practices. There's currently no way to create a&lt;br /&gt;
tightly scoped token that cannot be used to request a re-scoped token. A&lt;br /&gt;
scoped token cannot be relied upon to restrict actions to only that&lt;br /&gt;
scope.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Recommended Action ===&lt;br /&gt;
Users and deployers of OpenStack must not rely on the scope of tokens&lt;br /&gt;
to limit what actions can be performed using them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Concerned users are encouraged to read (OSSG member) Nathan Kinder's&lt;br /&gt;
blog post on this issue and some of the potential future solutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contacts / References ===&lt;br /&gt;
* Nathan Kinder on Token Scoping : https://blog-nkinder.rhcloud.com/?p=101&lt;br /&gt;
* This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0042&lt;br /&gt;
* Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1341816&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security/Kilo/Keystone&amp;diff=66690</id>
		<title>Security/Kilo/Keystone</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=Security/Kilo/Keystone&amp;diff=66690"/>
				<updated>2014-10-23T17:38:22Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nkinder: Created page with &amp;quot;This page documents security related details for the Keystone project in the OpenStack Kilo release. === Implemented Crypto === Keystone doesn't have an home-brewed encryption...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This page documents security related details for the Keystone project in the OpenStack Kilo release.&lt;br /&gt;
=== Implemented Crypto ===&lt;br /&gt;
Keystone doesn't have an home-brewed encryption implementations, everything is used from Python Standard libraries or third party libraries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Used Crypto ===&lt;br /&gt;
==== Libraries ====&lt;br /&gt;
* oauthlib (uses hashlib)&lt;br /&gt;
* OpenSSL&lt;br /&gt;
* PassLib&lt;br /&gt;
* PyCrypto&lt;br /&gt;
* Python hashlib&lt;br /&gt;
* python-ldap (ultimately uses GnuTLS, NSS, or OpenSSL depending on the platform)&lt;br /&gt;
* Requests (for keystoneclient HTTPS usage - '''need to investigate underlying crypto usage''')&lt;br /&gt;
** uses stdlib - https://github.com/kennethreitz/requests/blob/master/requests/packages/urllib3/connection.py&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Encryption Algorithms ====&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable sortable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
! Algorithm !! Purpose !! Configurable !! Implementation !! Details  !! Source&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| AES || Memcache backend encryption|| No || PyCrypto ||&lt;br /&gt;
* Optionally used for encrypting the token backend.&lt;br /&gt;
||&lt;br /&gt;
* keystoneclient.middleware.memcache_crypt.py&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| RSA || PKI token signing || Yes || OpenSSL ||&lt;br /&gt;
* 2048, sha1 defaults&lt;br /&gt;
* Configurable via openssl.conf.&lt;br /&gt;
* Keys/Certs can be created outside of Keystone and dropped into place.&lt;br /&gt;
||&lt;br /&gt;
* keystone.common.openssl.py&lt;br /&gt;
* keystoneclient.common.cms.py&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Hashing Algorithms ====&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable sortable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
! Algorithm !! Purpose !! Configurable !! Implementation !! Details  !! Source&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| md5 || Token hashing  || No || hashlib ||&lt;br /&gt;
* Hash is used as an internal identifier in the token backend.&lt;br /&gt;
* The data being hashed is the entire cryptographically signed token (which uses the configured signing key).  The chance for collisions should be low.&lt;br /&gt;
||&lt;br /&gt;
* keystoneclient.utils.py&lt;br /&gt;
* keystoneclient.common.cms.py&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| sha1 || S3 credentials || No || hashlib ||&lt;br /&gt;
* Used for signature validation of S3 credentials.&lt;br /&gt;
* Required for S3 compatibility, so it can't be configurable.&lt;br /&gt;
||&lt;br /&gt;
* keystone.contrib.s3.core.py&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| sha1 || OAuth1 || No || oauthlib ||&lt;br /&gt;
* Used for signature validation of OAuth1 tokens.&lt;br /&gt;
* Keystone only uses the HMAC-SHA1 signature for OAuth1 tokens (as described in [http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849 RFC 5849]).&lt;br /&gt;
* OAuth support can be disabled.&lt;br /&gt;
* Likely uses hashlib for the actual algorithm.&lt;br /&gt;
||&lt;br /&gt;
* keystone.contrib.oauth1.core.py&lt;br /&gt;
* keystone.contrib.oauth1.verifier.py&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| sha256 || EC2 tokens || No || hashlib ||&lt;br /&gt;
* Required for EC2 compatibility, so it can't be configurable.&lt;br /&gt;
||&lt;br /&gt;
* keystone.credential.controllers.py&lt;br /&gt;
* keystone.common.utils.py&lt;br /&gt;
* keystoneclient.contrib.ec2.utils.py&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| sha384 || Memcache signing || No || hashlib ||&lt;br /&gt;
* Used for signing and verification when memcache encryption is enabled.&lt;br /&gt;
||&lt;br /&gt;
* keystoneclient.middleware.memcache_crypt.py&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
| sha512 || Password hashing || No || PassLib ||&lt;br /&gt;
* The algorithm is non-configurable, but the number of rounds is configurable via CONF.crypt_strength (default=40000).&lt;br /&gt;
||&lt;br /&gt;
* keystone.common.utils.py&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Sensitive Data ===&lt;br /&gt;
==== Keys/Certificates ====&lt;br /&gt;
* PKI signing key - Protected via filesystem ownership/permissions.&lt;br /&gt;
* SSL/TLS key - Protected via filesystem ownership/permissions.&lt;br /&gt;
==== Passwords ====&lt;br /&gt;
* SSL/TLS must be enabled in Keystone to prevent clients from sending passwords over the network in clear-text.&lt;br /&gt;
* Strict password checking is performed prior to hashing. If it is set to true, the operation will fail with an HTTP 403 Forbidden error; if it is set to false, passwords are automatically truncated to the predefined maximum length.&lt;br /&gt;
** Configurable via CONF.strict_password_check (default=False)&lt;br /&gt;
** Configurable via CONF.identity.max_password_length (default=4096)&lt;br /&gt;
* SQL Identity&lt;br /&gt;
** Password hashes are stored in SQL database.&lt;br /&gt;
** SSL/TLS can be used to protect the connection to the database.&lt;br /&gt;
* LDAP Identity&lt;br /&gt;
** SSL/TLS must be used for connections to LDAP to prevent Keystone from sending passwords over the network in clear-text.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Tokens ====&lt;br /&gt;
*Signed tokens are stored in their entirety in one of the following backends:&lt;br /&gt;
** KVS&lt;br /&gt;
** Memcached&lt;br /&gt;
*** Ephemeral storage.&lt;br /&gt;
*** Able to use AES encryption and sha384 signing.&lt;br /&gt;
** SQL (default)&lt;br /&gt;
*** Persistent storage.&lt;br /&gt;
***SSL/TLS can be used to protect the connection to the database.&lt;br /&gt;
* Expired tokens are not automatically removed from the backend.  The &amp;quot;keystone-manage token_flush&amp;quot; command should be used to periodically remove expired tokens (via cron).&lt;br /&gt;
=== Potential Improvements ===&lt;br /&gt;
* Allow all hashing schemes to be configurable where not restricted by compatibility requirements (such as S3 and EC2)&lt;br /&gt;
* The use of md5 for token hashing is the biggest concern, as it's use is discouraged (or disallowed in the case of FIPS).  Changes are [https://review.openstack.org/#/c/80401/ in progress] to make this configurable in Juno.  The default should be sha256 if possible.&lt;br /&gt;
* Allow support for LDAP SASL bind methods(such as DIGEST-MD5 and GSSAPI).&lt;br /&gt;
* Allow other forms of external authentication to avoid using passwords (Kerberos, SAML).&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notable changes since Juno ===&lt;br /&gt;
* ?&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Nkinder</name></author>	</entry>

	</feed>